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INTRODUCTION
The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution is the Swiss army knife
of federal election law. Ensconced in Article I, it provides, “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” 1 Its
Article II analogue, the Presidential Electors Clause, similarly specifies that
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors” to select the President.2 The concise language
of these clauses performs a surprisingly wide range of functions
implicating numerous doctrines and fields beyond voting rights, including
statutory interpretation, 3 state separation of powers and other areas of state
constitutional law,4 federal court deference to state court rulings, 5
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
3
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that, because
the Constitution delegates plenary authority over presidential elections to state legislatures, “the text of
[an] election law itself . . . takes on independent significance”); id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
issue is whether . . . the law as declared by the [state] court [is] different from the provisions made by
the [state] legislature, to which the National Constitution commits responsibility for determining how
each State’s Presidential electors are chosen[.]”).
4
See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (holding that the Presidential Electors
Clause “operat[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the
legislative power” to regulate federal elections, including through “any provision in the state
constitution in that regard”); cf. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (recognizing that
the Presidential Electors Clause is among the “few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes
a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s government”).
5
Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam) (“As a general
2
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administrative discretion,6 and preemption. 7
States lack inherent power to regulate federal elections. Thus, when a
state does so, it is acting “by virtue of a direct grant of authority” under
the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause.8 These
constitutional provisions are “express delegations of power”9 that confer
upon state legislatures the authority to “provide a complete code” for
federal elections, including but not limited to laws concerning “notices,
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.” 10
At first blush, the meaning of the term “legislature” in the Elections
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause appears quite clear: it refers to the
entity within each state comprised of elected representatives that enacts
statutes. The Supreme Court, however, has taken a somewhat different
view. In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court held that the Elections
Clause allows a state’s citizens to use the referendum process established
by the state constitution to nullify a law enacted by the legislature
concerning federal redistricting. 11 It tersely rejected the argument that the
state legislature had exclusive power under the Elections Clause to enact or
repeal laws governing congressional elections, dismissing it as “plainly
without substance.” 12 Hildebrant permits a state to enact laws concerning
congressional elections through any process that the state constitution
includes within the state’s “legislative power,” even if the state legislature

rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state statute. But in the case of a [state]
law . . . applicable . . . to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is . . . acting . . . by virtue
of a direct grant of authority made under [the Presidential Electors Clause] of the United States
Constitution.”).
6
See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 & n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2008)
(holding that a directive from the Ohio Secretary of State concerning minor party candidates was
unconstitutional because it “purport[ed] to create new law” and, under the Elections Clause, “the
Secretary of State, a member of the executive branch of government, has no authority independent of
the Ohio General Assembly to direct the method of the appointment of . . . federal officials”).
7
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013) (holding that
federal laws passed under the Elections Clause are not subject to the traditional presumption against
preemption).
8
Palm Beach, 531 U.S. at 76; accord Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States
may regulate the incidents of [congressional] elections . . . only within the exclusive delegation of
power under the Elections Clause.”).
9
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995).
10
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). For a compelling discussion of the debates in the
Constitutional Convention concerning the Elections Clause, as well as the Supreme Court’s history of
interpreting it, see Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1220–33 (2012).
11
241 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1916).
12
Id. at 569.
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itself is not involved. 13
The Supreme Court explored the issue in greater depth in Smiley v.
Holm, in which it permitted a state governor to veto a federal redistricting
bill passed by the state legislature because the state constitution included
vetoes as part of the legislative process.14 It explained that a legislature’s
exercise of its power under the Elections Clause to enact laws governing
congressional elections “must be in accordance with the method which the
State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” 15 The Court added, “We
find no suggestion in the [Elections Clause] of an attempt to endow the
legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than
that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be
enacted.” 16
The scope of the Elections Clause is again before the Supreme Court
in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission. 17 Arizona voters passed a state constitutional amendment
through the initiative process to “remove[] congressional redistricting
authority from the Legislature and vest[] that authority in a new entity, the
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (‘IRC’).” 18 A three-judge
panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IRC’s
constitutionality because “Hildebrant and Smiley . . . demonstrate that the
word ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause refers to the legislative process
used in [a] state, determined by that state’s own constitution and laws,”19
rather than the institutional legislature itself. The Elections Clause therefore
“does not prohibit a state from vesting the power to conduct congressional
districting” in an entity other than the state legislature, such as Arizona’s
redistricting commission.20
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is poised to be the
Supreme Court’s first holding about whether a state’s institutional
legislative body may be wholly stripped of its powers concerning federal
redistricting, if not federal elections altogether. 21 The immediate effects of
13

Id. at 568–69.
285 U.S. 355, 368.
15
Id. at 367.
16
Id. at 367–68.
17
997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
18
Id. at 1048.
19
Id. at 1054.
20
Id. at 1056.
21
The Court has already stated in dicta that a state may permit entities other than the legislature
itself to redraw congressional districts. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“[R]eapportionment
is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a
federal court.”); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
14
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its ruling will reverberate far beyond Arizona, as six other states have
transferred authority to determine congressional district boundaries to an
entity other than the institutional legislature 22 More broadly, this case will
revisit the meaning of the term legislature as used in the Elections Clause
(and, by extension, Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause), confirming
whether it actually refers to: the legislature alone; the legislature plus
whatever other processes or entities a state constitution includes within the
lawmaking process; or any process or entity that a state constitution vests
with legislative power over federal elections, to the potential exclusion of
the institutional legislature.
This Essay contends that the term legislature should be interpreted in
accordance with its plain meaning, as referring solely and exclusively to
the multimember body of representatives within each state generally
responsible for enacting its laws. 23 This conclusion becomes especially
clear through an intratextual approach to the Elections Clause.
Part I of this Essay introduces the intratextual method of constitutional
interpretation, explaining how the Constitution’s repeated use of a term
often provides a wealth of context from which a court may discern the
term’s meaning. Part II offers an intratextual interpretation of the Elections
Clause, examining how each of the other contexts in which the Constitution
uses the term legislature demonstrates that it refers to a specific institution.
In fact, the Supreme Court itself employed an intratextual analysis in
Hawke v. Smith to conclude that Article V permits a state to ratify a
constitutional amendment only through a vote of its institutional legislature
(or a specially called convention), not a public referendum. 24
Part III shows that this understanding is confirmed by both a
traditional textualist approach to the term, as well as the “independent state
22
Redistricting Commissions and Alternatives to the Legislature Conducting Redistricting, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions.aspx
[http://perma.cc/R298-YKDT]; see also CAL. CONST. Art. XXI.
23
Much academic debate on this issue has focused on whether the Presidential Electors Clause
allows a state’s citizens to change the state’s method for allocating presidential electors from winnertake-all to a proportional system through a public initiative. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Direct
Democracy and Article II: Additional Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential Elections, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 631 (2008) (defending the use of ballot initiatives to change state laws governing
presidential elections); Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”:
Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 629
(2008) (“A strict textual view suggests that initiated reform is unconstitutional; case law and policy
arguments show the question is more uncertain. Reasonable judges could reach opposite conclusions on
the question.”); Nicholas P. Stabile, Comment, An End Run Around a Representative Democracy? The
Unconstitutionality of a Ballot Initiative to Alter the Method of Distributing Electors, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495 (2009) (arguing that the debates in the Constitutional Convention and historical practice
establish that institutional legislatures have sole power to determine the manner in which a state will
allocate its presidential electors among various candidates).
24
253 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1920).
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legislature” doctrine.25 This Essay briefly concludes that adopting an
intratextual approach to the term legislature—one informed by both
traditional textualism and the independent state legislature doctrine—would
help the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission Court reach the
most accurate understanding of the Elections Clause.
I.

IN DEFENSE OF AN INTRATEXTUAL APPROACH

Intratextualism counsels that the Constitution’s use of “strongly
parallel language [in different places] is a strong (presumptive) argument
for parallel interpretation” of that language. 26 This approach urges a reader
interpreting “a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution” to
consider its meaning as it appears in other passages. 27 “[T]extually
nonadjoining clauses” of the Constitution should be placed “side by side
for careful analysis,” to ensure that a proposed interpretation of a term
makes sense in the various contexts in which the Constitution deploys it. 28
Akhil Amar identifies three main types of intratextual arguments.
First, when attempting to determine the meaning of a word in a particular
clause, other constitutional provisions can “serve[] a basic dictionary
function” by “illustrat[ing] [its] usage.” 29 Second, a reader also may arrive
at the “best” interpretation of a term by determining the meaning that
would fit best with its usage throughout the Constitution.30 Finally, when
entire clauses are structured identically to each other, with only one or two
key words changed, they generally should be read in pari materia and
interpreted consistently. 31
Amar contends that the “greatest virtue of intratextualism” is that “it
takes seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab bag
of assorted clauses.” 32 He explores the Court’s long legacy of intratextual
analysis, 33 including Chief Justice John Marshall’s use of intratextualism in
McCulloch v. Maryland 34 and Justice Joseph Story’s use of it in Martin v.

25
The independent state legislature doctrine provides that a state legislature is not bound by
substantive restrictions or limits contained in a state constitution when exercising its power under the
Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause to regulate federal elections. See infra Part III.B.
26
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999).
27
Id. at 748.
28
Id. at 788.
29
Id. at 791.
30
Id. at 792–94.
31
Id. at 794–95.
32
Id. at 795.
33
Id. at 755–58, 760–63.
34
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412 (1819).
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Hunter’s Lessee. 35 As mentioned earlier, in Hawke v. Smith, the Court
adopted an intratextual approach to determine the meaning of the term
legislature as it appears in Article V.36 Academic commentators have also
applied this technique to various constitutional provisions. 37
Intratextual interpretation is not a mechanical process, however, as
“certain chameleon words should sensibly mean different things in
different clauses.” 38 When the Constitution uses a word differently in
different contexts, intratextualism can lead to misleading results.39
Moreover, “[c]arried to extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings that
are too clever by half—cabalistic overreadings conjuring up patterns that
were not specifically intended and that are upon deep reflection not truly
sound.” 40 Thus, intratextualism should be used to “suggest possible
readings” or “generate interpretative leads and clues” that must be assessed
through “other tools of interpretation,” not to “dictate results.” 41
Adrian Vermeule and Ernest A. Young offer a powerful critique of
intratextualism, questioning its premise that the Constitution should be
given a consistent, uniform interpretation. They point out that the document
may lack internal consistency because its “component provisions were
enacted at different times, in different circumstances, and for different
reasons.” 42 Even the text of the original, unamended Constitution is the
result of numerous “tradeoffs, political battles won and lost, and
35
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328–34 (1816). For a more recent example of the Court applying
intratextual analysis, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008), in which the Court
interpreted the phrase “right of the people” as used in the Second Amendment to protect an individual
right to bear arms, because the Constitution’s three other uses of that phrase “unambiguously refer to
individual rights.”
36
253 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1920).
37
E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the
Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1021–22 (2007)
(applying intratextualism to interpret the words “inferior” and “supreme” with regard to courts);
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 725 (2008) (same for the word “treaties”); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral
Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1757–58 (2002) (same for congressional authority
to regulate Presidential elections); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the
Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1172 (2003) (applying an intratextual
comparison of the Interstate, Foreign, and Indian Commerce Clauses). For articles where
intratextualism was deemed insufficient to support a particular interpretation, see Calvin Massey,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 493–94 (2002), and Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 39 (2013).
38
Amar, supra note 26, at 793; accord id. at 799.
39
E.g., Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175, 1181
(2003); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 767–68 (2000).
40
Amar, supra note 26, at 799.
41
Id.
42
Vermeule & Young, supra note 39, at 731; accord Clark, supra note 37, at 723.
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compromised ideals.” 43 Rather than an integrated document springing from
a single author, it is the product of a body of people disagreeing,
compromising, and amending each other’s work. It is highly unlikely that
the dozens of men who contributed to its writing all used important terms
consistently. 44
Moreover, because intratextualism requires judges to interpret a term
as it appears in numerous constitutional provisions, this approach may
unduly tax their “time, information, and expertise;” lead to more errors; and
allow for more subjectivity than a clause-bound method of interpretation. 45
Intratextualism is more indeterminate and manipulable than clause-bound
textualism, because it does not offer interpretive guidance when a term’s
apparent meaning based on a single clause in isolation differs from its
apparent meaning based on other clauses in which it appears. Thus, a
reader still must choose among competing interpretations using a theory or
process other than intratextualism itself.46 William Treanor, further
critiquing intratextualism from an originalist perspective, adds that it is
“unreliable” because it “privileges a small subset of contemporaneous
usages (those in the constitutional document) over the larger body of
relevant contemporaneous usages.” 47
At a minimum, intratextualism provides a useful data point for courts
to consider in determining the meaning of a disputed term, and would be
especially useful for the Supreme Court in interpreting the meaning of
legislature in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The
term is concrete and reasonably susceptible of only a limited number of
definitions. Moreover, it does not appear to lend itself to the type of
compromise or mutually inconsistent understandings to which other, more
general language might be subject.
Additionally, the original, unamended Constitution uses legislature on
several different occasions, thereby avoiding the issue of whether
subsequent constitutional amendments employ it in the same manner. As

43

Vermeule & Young, supra note 39, at 742.
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 (1842) (contending that because many of
the Constitution’s provisions “were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions[,] . . . no
uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it”).
45
Vermeule & Young, supra note 39, at 731; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 941 (2003).
46
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Utility and Significance of Professor Amar’s Holistic Reasoning,
87 GEO. L.J. 2327, 2330 (1999) (book review) (concluding that intratextualism “provides an almost
limitless array of possible interpretations or readings and posits no standard for measuring or choosing
among plausible interpretations”).
47
William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning,
and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 523–24 (2007).
44
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Part II demonstrates, the numerous other constitutional clauses that use the
term all refer to a state’s sole lawmaking body comprised of elected
representatives, rather than some broader conception of the word. This
consistent pattern of usage creates a strong presumption that the Elections
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause employ it in the same fashion.
And, as discussed in Part III, the results of this intratextual analysis can be
corroborated by both a plain meaning interpretation as well as the
longstanding independent state legislature doctrine. Even if the constraints
under which many judges operate may prevent them from using
intratextualism effectively, the Supreme Court can devote sufficient time
and attention to a case such as Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission to make intratextualism an appropriate and useful strategy.
II. INTRATEXTUALISM AND THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
The Constitution contains numerous references to state legislatures
that may be used to elucidate that term’s meaning as it appears in the
Elections Clause (and, by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause).
These references may be divided into four groups: (i) those that discuss
features of a legislature; (ii) those that distinguish between a state
legislature and other state personnel or entities; (iii) those that confer quasilegislative or nonlegislative powers upon legislatures; and (iv) those, such
as the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, that confer
legislative authority over certain subjects upon the legislature.
The text, context, original understanding, and consistent history of
interpretation of the Constitution’s first three types of references to the term
legislature demonstrate that it is best understood as referring to a state’s
general lawmaking body of elected representatives, rather than a broader
legislative power 48 or other entities upon which a state’s constitution may
attempt to confer a portion of that legislative power. These provisions
create a strong, and ultimately insurmountable, presumption that the same
meaning should be attributed to the term as it appears in the fourth category
of clauses: those such as the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause that grant state legislatures the power to enact certain types of laws.
A. Discussions of Legislatures
Several constitutional provisions’ usage of the term legislature reveals
that a legislature contains certain characteristics. For example, Article VI’s
Oath Clause requires that “Members of the several State Legislatures . . . be

48

Cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568–69 (1916).
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bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e] Constitution.”49 This
provision contemplates that a state legislature will have members. And its
requirement that such members pledge to uphold the federal Constitution is
best understood as referring to individuals who belong to a particular
lawmaking institution within a state, rather than members of some
overarching legislative power that conceivably encompasses the entire
voting public.
Similarly, Article I’s Qualifications Clause provides that a person may
vote for the U.S. House of Representatives if he possesses “the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
State Legislature.” 50 This provision treats the legislature as an entity that
presumptively features multiple branches and is comprised of
representatives chosen by voters.
Article I’s Senate Vacancies Clause (which has been superseded by
the Seventeenth Amendment) states that, if a vacancy occurs in the U.S.
Senate “during the Recess of the Legislature of any State,” the state
executive may make a temporary appointment “until the next Meeting of
the Legislature.” 51 Yet again, this provision contemplates the existence of
an institutional legislature whose members periodically meet and which
may be called into recess. Finally, the Domestic Violence Clause in Article
IV provides that, “on Application of the [state] Legislature, or of the [state]
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened),” the federal
government shall protect a state against “domestic Violence.”52 This further
corroborates the constitutional image of a legislature as a multimember
body that periodically convenes and adjourns.
Thus, every clause that gives some insight into the nature of a
legislature uses the term to refer to a particular institution within each state
that contains members, is presumptively comprised of multiple branches,
periodically convenes and meets for limited periods of time, and then
enters into recess.

49
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The Fourteenth Amendment contains similar references. Section 2
imposes penalties on states that deny the right to vote, including in elections for “members of the
legislature.” Id. amend. XIV, § 2. Section 3 prohibits a person from serving as a federal official who,
while “a member of any state legislature,” engages in “insurrection or rebellion” against the United
States unless Congress removes the disability by a two-thirds vote. Id. amend. XIV, § 3.
50
Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment contains identical language concerning U.S.
Senate elections. Id. amend. XVII, § 1.
51
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
52
Id. art. IV, § 4.
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B. Provisions That Distinguish Between Legislatures and Other State
Personnel and Entities
Several other constitutional provisions expressly distinguish between
legislatures (and their members) and other state officials and entities. For
example, as discussed above, the Oath Clause requires “Members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the
several States” to take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.53
Likewise, the Senate Vacancies Clause provides that, if a vacancy occurs
while the “Legislature of any State” is in recess, “the Executive thereof
may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the
Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” 54 And the Domestic
Violence Clause requires the federal government to protect a state “against
domestic Violence” upon “Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened).” 55 These provisions
all distinguish between the state legislature and the state executive (or state
executive officials). This juxtaposition of different branches suggests that,
just as references to a state’s executive are best construed as referring to its
governor, references to a state’s legislature are best construed as referring
to its main lawmaking body comprised of elected representatives.
Even more telling is Article V, which specifies that a proposed
constitutional amendment may be ratified either by “the Legislatures” or
“Conventions” in three-fourths of the States, depending on the mode of
ratification authorized by Congress.56 This clause demonstrates that, when
the Framers wished to authorize action by the people independent of their
institutional legislatures, they knew how to do so. Article V further bolsters
the conclusion that the term legislature refers exclusively to the particular
institution within a state that exercises its general lawmaking authority.
C. References to Quasi-Legislative or Nonlegislative Powers
Numerous constitutional provisions confer authority on state
legislatures other than the power to enact certain types of laws. The
Constitution grants them the power to choose U.S. Senators (since repealed
by the Seventeenth Amendment); 57 “fill” Senate vacancies; 58 “call” for a
53
Id. art. VI, cl. 3. Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment discussed above reprise this list of
State officials. See supra note 49.
54
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. The Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy provisions likewise distinguish
between the state legislature and the state’s “executive authority.” Id. amend. XVII, § 2.
55
Id. art. IV, § 4.
56
Id. art. V.
57
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
58
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; cf. id. amend. XVII, § 2.
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convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution; 59 “[a]ppl[y]” for
the federal government’s “protect[ion] . . . against domestic Violence;”60
“ratif[y]” proposed amendments to the Constitution; 61 and “[c]onsent” to
the formation of new states, 62 or to the federal government’s purchase and
exercise of exclusive authority over land within the state for the erection of
military facilities, docks, and other “needful Buildings.” 63
For most, if not all, of these provisions, the Framers’ debates over the
Constitution further confirm that they exclusively empower institutional
legislatures to perform the specified acts. For example, as originally
enacted, the Constitution directed state legislatures, rather than the
electorate, to choose U.S. senators.64 During the Constitutional Convention,
John Dickinson moved that senators be elected by state legislatures for two
reasons:
1. because the sense of the States would be better collected through their
Governments; than immediately from the people at large. 2. because he
wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters . . . and he
thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures,
than in any other mode. 65

He later added that granting legislatures this power would help preserve the
states as distinct entities and “produce that collision” between the federal
and state governments, “which should be wished for in order to check each
other.” 66
Throughout the ensuing debate, all delegates used the term legislature
consistently, referring to a particular, well-understood entity within each

59

Id. art. V.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
61
Id. art. V. Consistent with this provision, various constitutional amendments specify that they
would not take effect unless ratified by a sufficient number of state “legislatures” within a specified
period of time. Id. amend. XVIII, § 3; id. amend. XX, § 6; id. amend. XXII, § 2.
62
Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
63
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
64
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). This provision’s reference to legislatures was specifically
intended to preclude the electorate from playing a direct role in selecting U.S. Senators. See U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 884 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In the context of
congressional elections, the Framers obviously saw a meaningful difference between direct action by
the people of each State and action by their state legislatures.”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION § 701, at 182 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (observing that the Framers
unanimously voted for the Senate to be “chosen by the legislature of each state” rather than “by the
people thereof”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 323 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(distinguishing, in its discussion of the U.S. Senate, between “the State legislatures” and “the people at
large”).
65
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 150 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of John Dickinson).
66
Id. at 153 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of John Dickinson).
60
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state. 67 Later in the convention, James Wilson reiterated:
[O]ne branch of the Genl.—Govt. (the Senate or second branch) was to be
appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this
participation in the Genl. Govt. would have an opportunity of defending their
rights. . . . The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any
proposition in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures,
he conceived a general alarm [would] take place in the National Legislature
itself, that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and [would]
finally spread among the people at large. 68

Thus, in commenting on the selection of senators, Wilson expressly
distinguished among a “State” as a whole, state legislatures, and “the
people at large.” 69
Likewise, in discussing the Senate Vacancies Clause, the Framers’
debates unmistakably concerned institutional legislatures: they discussed
the relative frequency with which various states’ legislatures met and the
power of certain legislatures to select the state’s governor. 70 The same is
true of Article V’s delegation of authority to state legislatures to call for a
new constitutional convention and to ratify amendments to the
Constitution. 71 As the Supreme Court recognized in Hawke v. Smith,
legislature was “not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into
the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose
of interpretation. A legislature was then the representative body which
made the laws of the people.”72 The debates at the Constitutional
Convention also confirm that the power to request federal assistance under
the Domestic Violence Clause lies specifically in the institutional
legislature. 73
67
For example, Roger Sherman urged that “elections by the people” are not as likely “to produce
such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.” Id. at 154 (Madison’s Notes, June 7, 1787)
(statement of Roger Sherman). Elbridge Gerry similarly contended that allowing the people to select
Senators directly would give the “landed interest” an advantage and leave commercial interests with
“no security.” Id. at 152 (Madison’s Notes, June 7, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry). Conferring that
power on state legislatures, in contrast, would “be most likely to provide some check in favor of the
commercial interest [against] the landed; without which oppression will take place.” Id.
68
Id. at 355–56 (Madison’s Notes, June 21, 1787) (statement of James Wilson); see also id. at 366
(King’s Notes, June 21, 1787) (statement of James Wilson).
69
Id. at 355–56 (Madison’s Notes, June 7, 1787) (statement of James Wilson).
70
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 231 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(Madison’s Notes, Aug. 9, 1787) (statement of James Wilson).
71
U.S. CONST. art. V.
72
253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). The Court elaborated, “When [the Framers] intended that direct action
by the people should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such
purpose.” Id. at 228; see also Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (“The referendum
provisions of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the
United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it.”).
73
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 316–17, 466–67 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 17, 1787,
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D. References to Legislative Authority
The text, context, and Framers’ original understanding of the
numerous constitutional provisions referring to legislatures discussed above
confirm that they uniformly refer to the specific institution within each
state that is comprised of elected representatives and exercises general
lawmaking authority. Compelling evidence is therefore necessary to
conclude that the term has a different, unique, and unusual meaning as used
in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.
The Supreme Court previously held that the term legislature should be
accorded a different meaning in the Elections Clause (and, by extension,
the Presidential Electors Clause) because those provisions—unlike the
Constitution’s other references to legislatures—confer a type of
traditionally legislative authority on state legislatures: the ability to enact
laws regulating federal elections. 74 The Court never explained, however,
why this somewhat different context requires a unique definition of
legislature that differs from its use throughout the rest of the Constitution.
In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court held that the Elections
Clause permitted Congress to enact a law authorizing states to draw or alter
congressional districts through either state legislation or public referenda.75
It rejected as “plainly without substance” a challenge to a state referendum
that nullified a redistricting plan enacted by the Ohio legislature. 76 Despite
the Court’s single passing reference to the Elections Clause, however, it
assumed that any constitutional challenge to the use of public referenda to
regulate federal elections must arise under the Guarantee Clause. 77
According to the Court, the Petitioners were arguing that a public
referendum “introduce[s] a virus” that “annihilates representative
government and causes a State . . . to be not republican in form.” 78 It
summarily rejected that argument on the grounds that Guarantee Clause
Aug. 30, 1787).
74
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (holding that the language of the Elections Clause
“aptly points to the making of laws”); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause “call upon legislatures to
act in a lawmaking capacity whereas [the Ratification Clause] simply calls on the legislative body to
deliberate upon a binary decision”); Seth Barrett Tillman, Betwixt Principle and Practice: Tara Ross’s
Defense of the Electoral College, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 922, 925–26 (2005) (book review)
(contending that the term legislature can “have a variety of meanings depending on context”). The
Seventeenth Amendment also may be read in part as authorizing the enactment of legislation
concerning the temporary appointment of U.S. Senators to fill vacancies. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII,
§ 2.
75
241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916).
76
Id.
77
Id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
78
Id.
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claims are nonjusticiable.79 Thus, while Hildebrant mentioned the Elections
Clause, it neither held nor purported to explain why the electorate or a
public referendum qualifies as a legislature under the Elections Clause.
Rather, the Hildebrant Court failed to recognize that a distinct Elections
Clause claim existed, and instead transmuted the plaintiff’s claim under
that provision into a nonjusticiable Guarantee Clause argument.
In Hawke v. Smith, the Court held that the term legislature in the
Article V Amendment Clause refers exclusively to “the representative body
which ma[kes] the laws of the people.” 80 The Court distinguished
Hildebrant by contending that the case held the Elections Clause “plainly
gives authority to the State to legislate” concerning federal elections
through public referenda. 81 Congress therefore could recognize a
“referendum as part of the legislative authority of the State” under
constitutional provisions dealing with the enactment of laws. 82 “Such
legislative action,” the Court reasoned, “is entirely different from the
requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a
proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative
action is authorized or required.” 83
Hawke’s premise—that Hildebrant purported to interpret the Elections
Clause—is an overstatement. As discussed above, Hildebrant
misinterpreted or avoided the Elections Clause issue by transmuting it into
a Guarantee Clause claim. 84 In any event, Hawke never explained why the
term legislature should be given different meanings under the Elections
Clause and Article V (or the other constitutional provisions it surveyed).
The Court pointed out that enacting statutes under the Elections Clause to
regulate federal elections is a traditional legislative activity, while ratifying
constitutional amendments under Article V is a quasi- or nonlegislative
act. 85 It did not explain, however, why this distinction requires or justifies
attributing a different and unusual meaning to the term legislature. In light
of the Constitution’s consistent usage of that term throughout the rest of the
document, there is a strong presumption that the Elections Clause and
Presidential Electors Clause use it in the same manner—a presumption that
neither Hildebrant nor Hawke overcomes.
The Court gestured toward these issues in Smiley v. Holm, in which it
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
Hawke, 253 U.S. at 231.
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considered whether the Elections Clause permits a state’s governor to veto
a state law regulating federal elections that the state’s institutional
legislature enacted.86 Smiley reiterated that, unlike most other constitutional
provisions referring to legislatures, the Elections Clause grants them
lawmaking authority. 87 The Court held, “As the authority is conferred for
the purpose of making laws for the State, it follows, in the absence of an
indication of a contrary intent, that the exercise of the authority must be in
accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative
enactments.” 88 Smiley never held that the term legislature should mean
something other than a state’s institutional, representative lawmaking body.
Rather, it concluded only that when such an entity exercises authority
under the Elections Clause, it must do so subject to the standard lawmaking
process set forth in the state constitution, including a gubernatorial veto.89
Thus, the holdings of both Hawke and Smiley are consistent with an
intratextual reading of the term legislature as used in the Elections Clause
and Presidential Electors Clause, and Hildebrant does not actually address
the issue. The Supreme Court never identified any evidence that the
Framers intended to use the term differently in those provisions than
throughout the rest of the Constitution. Nor did it provide a persuasive
explanation as to why the word should mean something different when
referring to the exercise of a traditionally legislative power rather than a
quasi- or nonlegislative power.
The Federalist Papers confirm that the term legislature bears the same
meaning in the Elections Clause as it does in Article I, Section Three,
which permitted state legislatures to select U.S. senators. Federalist No. 59
explains that state legislatures seeking to undermine the national
government are more likely to do so by abusing their power under the
Elections Clause by refusing to hold House elections, than by refusing to
appoint Senators. 90 The Elections Clause itself alleviates this risk by
permitting Congress to impose its own rules for congressional elections if
states fail to act.91 The early Commentaries of both St. George Tucker 92 and

86

285 U.S. 355, 365–66 (1932).
Id. at 367.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 372–73.
90
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 302–04 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
91
Id. at 302.
92
1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. Note D, pt. 2, at 143–44 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803).
87
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Chancellor Kent 93 likewise discuss legislatures under Article I, Section
Three and under the Elections Clause—often in the same sentence—
without suggesting any potential differences in the term’s meaning. Kent
also distinguished between having the legislature select presidential
electors and allowing the “people at large” to do so, confirming that a
power vested in a “legislature” may not be exercised directly by the
electorate as a whole.94
Thus, the best reading of the word legislature as it appears throughout
the Constitution, including in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause, is that it refers solely and exclusively to a state’s general
lawmaking body comprised of elected representatives and cannot extend to
other entities such as independent redistricting commissions.
III. CONFIRMING THE INTRATEXTUAL CONCLUSION
Even compelling intratextual arguments can be further bolstered
through outside confirmation. 95 Here, an intratextual interpretation of the
term legislature is confirmed by the original understanding of that term in
the Founding Era, as well as the independent state legislature doctrine that
courts applied for well over a century and a half following the
Constitution’s enactment.
A. Original Understanding
An intratextual interpretation of the term legislature is consistent with
a clause-bound approach that focuses on how that term was generally
understood in the Founding Era. Any such textual analysis must begin with
dictionaries from that period. 96 Matthew Hale’s 1713 The History of the
Common Law of England defines the British legislature as comprised of
three parts: the King of the Realm and the two Houses of Parliament.97
Citing Hale’s work, Samuel Johnson’s mid-1700s dictionary defines
legislature as “the power that makes laws.” 98 Several other Founding Era
dictionaries utilized Johnson’s definition verbatim. 99 James Barclay’s
93

1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, pt. 2, lecture XI, at 210–12 (New York, O.
Halsted 1826).
94
Id., pt. 2, lecture XIII, at 232.
95
See Amar, supra note 26, at 799.
96
See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).
97
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 2 (London, J. Nutt 1713).
98
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 32 (London, W. Strahan
1755).
99
E.g., CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 285
(Boston, Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews 1800); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE
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dictionary both incorporates Johnson’s definition and, in its accompanying
discussion, explains that the legislature is comprised of the House of Lords
and the House of Commons. 100
Entities such as the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
would not qualify as legislatures under the prevailing definition from the
Founding Era for at least three reasons. First, those definitions’ use of the
definite article “the” implies the existence of a single legislature within
each sovereign entity. They appear to preclude recognition of multiple
entities within a state as legislatures. Second, the definitions refer to the
exercise of a general lawmaking power. An entity specifically empowered
only to enact certain kinds of laws or perform certain narrow functions (i.e.,
drawing congressional districts) would not qualify as a legislature. Third,
drawing congressional districts arguably does not even qualify as
“mak[ing] laws.”
Perhaps more importantly, every state constitution from the Founding
Era that used the term legislature defined it as a distinct multimember
entity comprised of representatives with the authority to enact laws, 101 and
most other references to legislatures throughout those documents are
consistent with that understanding. 102 If the Elections Clause and
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 360 (London, Charles Dilly, 2d ed. 1789).
100
JAMES BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN, at xli–
xlii, 603 (London, J.F. and C. Rivington, 1792).
101
DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 2 (“The legislature shall be formed of two distinct branches; they
shall meet once or oftener in every year, and shall be called, ‘The general assembly of Delaware.’”);
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II (“The legislature of this State shall be composed of the representatives of
the people . . . and the representatives shall be elected yearly . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. I
(“THAT the Legislature consist of two distinct branches, a Senate and House of Delegates, which shall
be styled, The General Assembly of Maryland.”); MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, § II, art. II; pt. II, ch. I,
§ III, art. I (“The Senate shall be the first branch of the legislature . . . . There [also] shall be, in the
legislature of this commonwealth, a representation of the people, annually elected . . . .”); N.Y. CONST.
of 1777, art. II (“[T]he supreme legislative power within this State shall be vested in two separate and
distinct bodies of men . . . who together shall form the legislature . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 2
(“The legislative shall be formed of two distinct branches, who, together, shall be a complete
Legislature.”); see also N.H. CONST. of 1776, para. 4 (discussing “both branches of the legislature”);
N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VI (establishing the Council as “a free and independent branch of the
Legislature of this Colony”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration XVIII (“[T]he people have a right to
assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to
the Legislature, for redress of grievances.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI (“[T]he people have a right
to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to
the legislature for redress of grievances . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. IX (providing that the “journal
shall be laid before the legislature when required by either house”). The organic documents of
Connecticut and Rhode Island did not refer to a legislature. CHARTER OF CT. of 1662; GOVERNMENT OF
NEW HAVEN COLONY of 1643; CONST. OF THE COLONY OF NEW-HAVEN of 1639; FUNDAMENTAL
ORDERS OF CT. of 1639; R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS CHARTER of 1663. See generally FRANCIS
NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1909) (collecting historical state and colony constitutions).
102
DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3, 5, 12–13, 16, 24–25, 29; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XII, XXXV, LI,
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Presidential Electors Clause used the term legislature in a broader capacity,
they would apparently be the only provisions in any organic document
from the Founding Era to do so—not a single precedent in any state
constitution supports a more expansive interpretation.
The Federalist Papers and Justice Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution reinforce this interpretation. Federalist No. 59 and Section 814
of Story’s Commentaries, which focus specifically on the Elections Clause,
contend that there “were only three ways” in which the power to regulate
federal elections could have been allotted: “[I]t must either have been
lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures,
or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former.” 103 They explain that
the Elections Clause embodies the final alternative. 104 These passages’
contrast of the “national legislature,” which refers exclusively to Congress,
with “state legislatures” strongly suggests that the latter refers to a state’s
analogue to Congress: its institutional legislature, comprised of elected
representatives, which exercises general lawmaking authority.
William Rawle’s A View of the Constitution likewise states that the
Elections Clause permits Congress to “make or alter” regulations governing
federal elections, “except as to the place of choosing senators,” to “guard
against a refractory disposition, should it ever arise in the legislatures of the
states,” concerning such elections. 105 He explains that the Elections
Clause’s exception concerning the place of choosing senators “was proper,
as congress ought not to have the power of convening the state legislature
at any other than its usual place of meeting.”106 Thus, Rawle also treated the
entity empowered to select senators as the same one delegated sole
constitutional authority to regulate federal elections (subject only to
congressional override).

LIV–LV, LXII; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, § III, art. V; id. pt. II, ch. II, § III, art. VII, superseded by
MASS. CONST. amend. XXV; id. pt. II, ch. III, art. I–II; id. pt. II, ch. VI, art. II; id. pt. II, ch. VI, art. X,
annulled by MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII; MD. CONST. of 1776, declarations III, V, VII–XII, XX,
XXVI, XXVIII, XXX, XXXIII–XXXV, XLII; id. art. II, XV, XVIII, XXVI, XLIII, LVI; N.J. CONST.
of 1776, art. XIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III, V–VI, XII, XV, XVIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776,
declaration XXV; id. art. XLIII; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 9, 30–31, 33, 35, 37, 47; S.C. CONST. of 1778,
art. II, XII–XXIV, XXXIV, XXXVIII.
103
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also
2 STORY, supra note 64, § 814, at 281.
104
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301–02 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); 2 STORY,
supra note 64, § 814, at 281–82.
105
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 42
(Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825).
106
Id.
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B. The Independent State Legislature Doctrine
Finally, the independent state legislature doctrine, which has been
embraced by the Supreme Court, state courts, and both houses of
Congress, 107 further confirms the accuracy of an intratextual interpretation
of legislature. This doctrine recognizes that a state legislature’s authority to
regulate federal elections comes directly from the U.S. Constitution.108
Consequently, a state constitution may neither impose substantive limits on
the scope of a legislature’s authority to regulate the time, place, or manner
of federal elections, nor strip the legislature of its prerogative to do so.
Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission flatly violates the
independent state legislature doctrine because the state constitutional
amendment that created it purports to strip the legislature, as a matter of
state constitutional law, of authority it derives directly from the U.S.
Constitution.
In 1892, the Supreme Court recognized the independent state
legislature doctrine in dicta in McPherson v. Blacker. 109 It stated that the
Presidential Electors Clause “operat[es] as a limitation upon the State in
respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power” concerning
presidential elections, including through “any provision in the state
constitution in that regard.” 110 This reasoning applies with equal force to
congressional elections and the Elections Clause.
The Court went even further in Leser v. Garnett, in which it held that
the doctrine also applies to a state legislature’s role in ratifying
constitutional amendments under Article V.111 It ruled that a legislature’s
“function . . . in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution . . . is a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution;
and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a
State.” 112 A state constitutional provision purporting to prevent the
legislature from ratifying certain amendments to the U.S. Constitution is
therefore unenforceable. 113
Several state courts have relied on the independent state legislature
doctrine as an essential component of their holdings concerning the
107
See Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 189, 198–204 (2014).
108
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States may regulate the incidents of [federal]
elections . . . only within the exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause.”).
109
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
110
Id. at 25.
111
258 U.S. 130, 135 (1922).
112
Id. at 137.
113
Id. at 136–37.
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Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. For example, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in In re Plurality Elections that the
state constitution may not “impose a restraint upon the power of
prescribing the manner of holding [federal] elections which is given to the
legislature by the constitution of the United States without restraint.”114 The
court enforced a state law providing that a candidate had to receive only a
plurality of votes to win a federal election, despite a state constitutional
provision specifying that all candidates had to receive an absolute majority
to prevail. 115
Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was
“unnecessary . . . to consider whether or not there is a conflict between the
method of appointment of presidential electors directed by the Legislature”
and a particular provision of the state constitution.116 It explained that a
state constitution may not “‘circumscribe the legislative power’ granted by
the Constitution of the United States” to regulate the selection of
presidential electors.117 Other courts have reached the same conclusion.118
The U.S. House of Representatives adopted the independent state
legislature doctrine in resolving an election challenge in Baldwin v.
Trowbridge. 119 The House upheld the validity of votes cast in a
congressional election pursuant to a state law that authorized voting by
military members who were absent from their districts on Election Day,
despite a state constitutional provision requiring that all votes be cast in
person. 120 Similarly, in a report on the Electoral College, the U.S. Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections concluded that a state legislature’s
power under the Presidential Electors Clause to regulate presidential
elections cannot be:

114

8 A. 881, 882 (R.I. 1887).
Id.
116
State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 287 (Neb. 1948).
117
Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
118
See, e.g., In re Opinion of Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 601 (1864) (holding that, because a State
legislature’s “authority . . . to prescribe the time, place and manner of holding elections for
representatives in Congress” is derived from the Elections Clause, “[t]he constitution and laws of this
State are entirely foreign to the question”); Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d
691, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944). Modern courts also occasionally apply the independent state legislature
doctrine. See, e.g., PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747–48 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (noting that
the Pennsylvania legislature’s authority to regulate the manner in which congressional and presidential
elections are conducted stems from the U.S. Constitution and “is not circumscribed by the Pennsylvania
Constitution”), aff’d 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013).
119
D.W. BARTLETT, DIGEST OF ELECTION CASES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 41-152, at 46–47 (1870).
120
2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 856 (1907); see also In re Holmes, 1 id. § 525.
115
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taken from [state legislatures] or modified by their State constitutions any
more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever
provisions may be made by statute, or by the State constitution, to choose
electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to
resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor
abdicated. 121

Numerous commentators have embraced the independent state
legislature doctrine,122 while others have rejected it.123 Its longstanding
history and acceptance by state and federal courts, as well as both houses of
Congress, however, confirm the validity of an intratextual interpretation of
the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The legislature, as
referenced in those provisions, is the state’s general lawmaking body, and
its power under the federal Constitution to regulate federal elections may
not be reduced or withdrawn by state constitutions.
CONCLUSION
Because of the Constitution’s numerous references to state
legislatures, an intratextual approach sheds compelling light on the term’s
proper meaning in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.
The text, context, drafting history, contemporaneous interpretations, and
history of subsequent judicial interpretation of the numerous other
constitutional provisions referring to legislatures collectively confirm that
the term refers exclusively to the elected body of representatives within
each state that exercises general lawmaking authority. Neither the Supreme
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S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874).
See, e.g., Walter Clark, The Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 737,
741 (1917) (“[T]he exercise of such power [to regulate presidential elections] is given to the state
legislature subject to no restriction from the state constitution.”); Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make
Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 835 (2001) (“Suppose, then, that the state
constitution forbade felons to vote. If the legislature, operating under the authority granted it by Article
II rather than by the state constitution, decided that this limitation should not apply in voting for
presidential electors, the legislative choice should prevail.”); James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the
Power of State Legislatures over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1962)
(“[S]tate legislatures are limited by constitutional provisions for veto, referendum, and initiative in
prescribing the manner of choosing presidential electors, but . . . state constitutional provisions
concerning suffrage qualifications and the manner of choosing electors do not limit the substantive
terms of legislation.”).
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See, e.g., Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 783–84 (2001) (arguing that the Founders did not construe the Presidential
Electors Clause as authorizing state legislatures to act independently of state constitutions); see also
Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 727–28
(2001) (accepting Smith’s conclusion that, “as a matter of historical practice, state legislatures were not
understood at the time to be more ‘independent’ by virtue of Article II of the constraints and conditions
on their power than they were when acting pursuant to any other source of authority”); David A.
Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 748 (2001) (“It is far from
clear what the relationship is between a state’s constitution and the power that a state ‘legislature’ may
exercise under Article II, Section 1 to ‘direct’ the ‘manner’ in which electors are appointed.”).
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Court nor academic commentators have provided a persuasive reason for
concluding that, despite the consistent usage of the term throughout most of
the Constitution, it should be given a different and unusual construction
solely for purposes of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors
Clause.
In particular, there is no basis for concluding that the word legislature
as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause refers
broadly to a state’s “lawmaking authority,” allowing a state’s voters to
directly regulate federal elections through public initiatives or referenda.
Likewise, because the Constitution specifically empowers the state
legislature to regulate the “Time, Place and Manner” of federal elections,
attempts to allow outside entities such as the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission to determine the boundaries of congressional
districts violate the U.S. Constitution.
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